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SUBJECT: Outline and Requirements for Evaluating the Current U.S. Capability to Detect Unlocated, or Covertly Introduced Forces in the NGA, in Violation of an MBFR Accord

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of the paper is to discuss a methodology for evaluating the U.S. capability to detect ~~unlocated~~ ^{possibly located} Warsaw Pact ground force units currently in the NGA, and to determine the prospects of detecting covertly introduced ground force units which may indicate a violation of a MBFR agreement with the Warsaw Pact.
2. DISCUSSION: Part I of the Study Series requires a two prong approach to determining the current U.S. Collection Resource Performance against basic MBFR Monitoring Requirements. The first approach was described in the final draft paper of 5 June 74 as one of surveillance of known ground force units and installations. The second approach can be described as a search problem. In question form the search problem is:

What is the U.S. Collection Resource capability to detect and determine the nature of ~~unidentified~~ ^{possibly unit located} Soviet Ground Force units presently in the NGA and/or new Soviet ground force units entering the NGA in violation of an MBFR accord?

3. METHODOLOGY: In assessing the U.S. capability to monitor this search problem the initial step would be to identify the collection

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resources which have a capability to detect, identify, and locate ground force units in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Secondly, define this capability for each collection resource and further outline the limitation of each as pertains to detecting, locating, and identifying ground force units. This phase would develop a "foot print" of collection capabilities for each collector, that is, a graphic depiction of the capabilities and limitations of each collector. The next phase would entail defining a set of indicators, both political and military which might indicate the presence of an unknown ground force unit in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Finally, outline these indicators in matrix form, using the variable of time so as to assess at what time prior to, in conjunction with, or after an introduction of a new force, each indicator would be expected to surface. Once the data gathering phase is completed, collection resource managers should analyze each collector's capability to collect against each indicator and estimate the probability of detecting intelligence pertaining to each. Historical data such as the Czechoslovakia, the 1963 Cuban crisis, etc., would materially assist in making this assessment. This analysis should provide a time variable and probability of collection at each variable (e.g., the probability of detecting intelligence associated with one variable might be extremely low in 24 hours after an event but high after 7 days). The surveillance

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evaluation in Part I will also provide strong indicators of our ability to detect units geographically in each country. Conclusions on an all-source basis could then be drawn from the individual collection resource managers assessments.

4. Attached is a schedule, outline, and designation of each agency's responsibilities for completion of each phase.

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SEARCH PROBLEM OUTLINE SCHEDULE
AND RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

<u>Step 1 - Foot Print Data</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Completion Schedule</u>
1. ID Collection Resources having:	NSA	July 15
a. Capability to detect unknown or new units in each country	CIA	
	DIA	
	NPIC	
b. Define limitations of these collectors		
<u>Step 2 - Indicators</u>		
1. Define indicators:	DIA (DI-3)	July 15
	CIA (OSR)	
a. Political		
b. Military		
2. Determine time phase of each indicator:	DIA (DI-3)	July 15
	CIA (OSR)	
a. Prior to introduction		
b. During introduction		
c. After unit introduced		
<u>Step 3 - Analysis of Collection Capability</u>		
1. By individual collection discipline:	DIA (DC)	Aug 15
	CIA	
a. SIGINT	NSA	
	NPIC	
b. HUMINT	Mil Svcs	
c. Imagery		

Step 4 - All-Source Capability

1. Conclusions

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